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IF CAP AND TRADE IS THE ANSWER, 
SOMEBODY IS ASKING THE WRONG QUESTION: 
AN EVALUATION OF CAP AND TRADE 





Cap and trade has emerged as one of the most discussed public policy 
mechanisms for reducing the emission of carbon into the atmosphere.  It is 
a top priority of the Obama Administration and is favored by many in 
Congress.  Cap and trade was a keystone of the controversial “American 
Clean Energy and Security Act” passed by the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives in the summer of 2009.  Unfortunately, it is a policy that seems 
ill-suited to meeting its proposed goal.  Mounting evidence suggests it does 
not accomplish very well, or at least very efficiently, its goal to “protect the 
environment.”  It does not provide the price certainty needed for proper 
future planning of our nation’s energy resources.  It is sufficiently unlike 
past cap and trade schemes so as to suggest any past success would not be 
indicative of successful implementation in the carbon context.  And while 
its inherent flaws thwart its stated goals, its implementation would be 
harmful to the nation’s economy, generally, and disproportionately to North 
Dakota’s, specifically.  Putting aside the scientific debate about anthropo-
genic global climate change, the international nature of carbon as an 
emissions source calls for a much different approach to the issue at hand.  A 
more prudent approach to reducing carbon would involve heavy reliance in 
research and development of new sources of energy, with much less 
emphasis on “placing a price on carbon.”  This would ensure that nations 
around the world would do what is best for both their own economic self-
interest, as well as their own long-term environmental interest. 
 
*North Dakota Public Service Commissioner, elected in 2000.  Before his election, he was 
North Dakota’s Labor Commissioner, serving in the cabinet of former Governor Ed Schafer.  
Commissioner Clark is a former state legislator, representing District 44 (Fargo, North Dakota) in 
the North Dakota State House from 1994-97.  He holds bachelor’s degrees from North Dakota 
State University and a master’s degree in public administration from the University of North 
Dakota. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the most discussed items on the federal government’s agenda 
since the November 2008 elections has been the prospect of a national 
framework for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  The approach 
for addressing GHG reductions that has emerged with the greatest support 
within the present Congressional majority and the Obama Administration is 
known as “cap and trade.”  This article seeks to explain the basic construct 
of cap and trade, with a special emphasis on the factors driving the policy 
and its policy implications for the State of North Dakota.  Given the wide-
spread flaws of cap and trade, generally, and its harmful effect on North 
Dakota, specifically, it is not surprising the proposal has garnered so little 
support within the Peace Garden State.1 
II. WHAT IS CAP AND TRADE? 
A November 2008 report released by the National Regulatory Research 
Institute (NRRI) explains cap and trade as working in three steps: 
(1) An overall cap on emissions is defined for a set of entities.  In a 
cap and trade program for GHGs, the cap will most likely be 
 
1. See Margo Thorning & Pinar Cebi, Cap & Trade and North Dakota’s Economic Future, 
N.D. POL’Y COUNCIL, Jan. 13, 2010, available at http://www.accf.org/publications/129/cap-trade-
and-north-dakotas-economic-future (describing how the proposed cap and trade system would 
negatively impact North Dakota). 
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defined in terms of CO2 equivalents.  The set of entities could be 
as limited as those in the electric generation sector, or as broad as 
all fossil fuel users plus major emitters of other GHGs like 
methane. 
(2) The right to emit the quantity of emissions defined by the cap 
is translated into emissions allowances.  The unit of allowances in 
a GHG cap and trade is likely to be one metric ton of CO2.  De-
pending on choices in program design, the responsible government 
agency allocates allowances to specified entities at no cost, sells 
the allowances to the affected entities or to other parties, or does a 
combination of allocation and sales.  All GHGs emitted by the 
entities in the program must be accompanied by the surrender of 
an equal amount of allowances. 
(3) The allowances can be exchanged among any parties at any 
price mutually agreeable to buyers and sellers.2 
The concept sounds simple enough:  the government sets an emissions 
limit, it allocates an allowance to emit under the limit, and those who 
receive permits to emit, either through free allocations of the allowances or 
their auction, can trade them, creating a “market-set” price for the right to 
emit.  Over time, the limit is lowered, making it more expensive to emit 
GHGs.  By driving up the cost of GHG emissions, the hope is that alter-
native, non-GHG, sources for uses like electricity and transportation will 
look relatively more attractive. 
Yet the cap and trade legislation is anything but simple.  Its primary 
vehicle, H.R. 2454, better known as “Waxman-Markey,” is 1428 pages in 
length.3  The NRRI report lists numerous factors that can be taken into 
consideration in designing a cap and trade program, among them: 
• stringency of the cap 
• breadth of coverage 
• point of administration 
• which GHGs are covered 
• how allowances are allocated or auctioned 
• allowable offsets 
• whether allowances can be banked 
• whether there is a price safety valve mechanism 
 
2. Andrew Keeler, State Commission Electricity Regulation Under a Federal Greenhouse 
Gas Cap-and-Trade Policy, National Regulatory Research Institute, Ohio State University, Nov. 
2008, available at http://nrri.org/pubs/electricity/08-01.pdf. 
3. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA), H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2009). 
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• the compliance mechanisms 
• how money to be raised through the program is to be spent by 
government[.]4 
Each of these factors has a policy implication and a constituency.  And, 
in Washington, D.C., each of these has multiple lobbyists working to 
represent various interests that can be harmed or benefitted depending upon 
how each decision point is approached.  Given the fact that the United 
States, and the entire world, are overwhelmingly dependent on carbon 
(GHG emitting) resources to fuel the economy, the stakes could not be 
higher.5  The logrolling required to piece together a bill that attempts to 
meet as many of these demands as possible is precisely how a relatively 
simple concept is turned into a nearly 1500 page legislative monstrosity.6 
III. UNDERSTANDING CAP AND TRADE 
The key to understanding a good deal of what is driving cap and trade 
is to understand that the debate has surprisingly little to do with the 
environment itself or the science of anthropogenic climate change theories.  
If GHG emissions reductions in the name of saving the environment were 
solely the aim of legislation, reductions could be achieved through a cap.  
Granted, the change would be technologically and financially difficult, to 
say the least.  But, if GHG emissions are a problem, the likes of which 
some purport, then a declining cap is how to reduce them. 
Conversely, if the proponents of legislation were merely trying to “put 
a price on carbon,” as many have suggested should be done, the solution is 
just as easy.  A carbon tax would do that in a much more economically-
efficient manner, and without the accompanying bureaucracy to administer 
a cap and trade program.  It is for this reason that one prominent climate 
change researcher has written, “the pseudonym ‘cap and trade’ must be 
replaced by ‘tax and trade.’  One is no more a tax than the other; they both 
raise the price of energy for the consumer.”7  Rather, to understand the 
 
4. See Keeler, supra note 2, at 6-17 (discussing various factors or elements for consideration 
in designing a cap and trade program). 
5. See generally Energy Information Administration (EIA) Website, available at www. 
eia.doe.gov (providing statistical information of energy consumption in the United States and 
internationally). 
6. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA), H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2009). 
7. See Letter from James E. Hansen, Adjunct Professor, NASA Goddard Institutes for Space 
Studies at Columbia University, to Dr. Martin Parkinson, Secretary, Australian Department of 
Climate Change (May 11, 2009) [hereinafter Hansen Letter], available at http://www.columbia. 
edu/~jeh1/.  Professor Hansen is a particularly vocal opponent of cap and trade.  The letter sent to 
Dr. Parkinson supports a “tax and dividend,” which is essentially a carbon tax, with a return of the 
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appeal of cap and trade, one must understand the political, economic, and 
technical environments more than the natural one. 
The difficulty of a simple cap is the reality that pivoting from a carbon-
based economy to something else is exceedingly difficult.  According to the 
Energy Information Administration, approximately half the electricity 
produced in the United States comes from coal.8  The transportation sector 
is overwhelmingly powered by fossil fuels.9  The agricultural sector is also 
a large emitter of GHGs.10  To expect that these pillars of our way of life be 
fundamentally overhauled in a short period of time would not just be cost 
prohibitive; it would risk the very reliability of the availability of these 
services.  Yet, theoretically, a cap with reasonable timetables and expec-
tations, and tied to technological advancements, could work in reducing 
emissions. 
The difficulty of a carbon tax is both political and economic.  It has 
garnered limited support in Congress for obvious reasons.11  A carbon tax 
would place a price on carbon, which some advocate is an externality 
whose costs should be made explicit.  But it is an understatement to suggest 
that a tax is politically unpopular.  A tax is also an economic drag on 
whatever is taxed.  In the case of GHGs, because carbon fuels the bulk of 
the economy, it is a far-reaching drag on the entire economy.  The current 
economic recession makes it an even more difficult sell than in more 
ordinary times. 
In contrast, cap and trade has become the primary vehicle for GHG 
reductions because of what it offers those drafting the legislation.  While a 
hard cap would entail hard choices, the complex system of allowances, 
offsets, and trading under cap and trade creates a series of constituencies the 
legislation’s sponsors can weave into a bill that produces entirely new 
levers of power within government and industry.  Allowances can be 
auctioned to raise money for government, or they can be given freely, 
which creates a subsidy for the recipient.  It is a subsidy for which the 
 
revenue directly to citizens to lessen the burden of increasing energy bills.  Professor Hansen has 
also written extensively about the perils of cap and trade. Id. 
8. Energy Information Administration Website, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/ 
electricity/epa/epates html [hereinafter EIA Website]. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. See Jim Efstathiou Jr. and Kim Chipman, Energy Measures May Go to Jobs Bill After 
Brown Win (Update1), BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://www.businessweek. 
com/news/2010-01-21/energy-measures-may-go-to-jobs-bill-as-brown-win-saps-cap-trade html 
(describing how the current political and economic climate has substantially decreased the 
likelihood of any significant cap and trade legislation); see also Lisa Leher, GOP Warns of Harsh 
Climate on Energy Bill, POLITICO, Dec. 22, 2009, available at http://www.politico.com/news/ 
stories/1209/ 30886 html (describing how it will be difficult for any climate legislation to pass 
prior to the 2010 mid-term elections). 
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recipient will become increasingly dependent on government over time.  
Yet, for every allowance given, the purported environmental benefit de-
creases.  The creation of offsets, a sort of environmental “indulgence,” 
allows entire offset industries to be created out of thin air.  Speculative mar-
kets for carbon credit trading, offsets, and derivatives will be an outgrowth. 
All the above will spur the need for even more government oversight, 
for who will “monitor” all these issues but an entirely new class of 
regulators?  It is confusing and bureaucratic.  But, building such constitu-
encies is one way to shepherd legislation as sweeping as this, all in the 
name of “going green.” 
Similarly, while cap and trade has a very similar net effect to con-
sumers as a carbon tax would, it is not explicitly a “tax,” so it provides 
political cover.  After all, what is the sense in the IRS collecting a politi-
cally unpopular tax when utility companies can do it for you shrouded 
behind layers of complex regulatory accounting?  Put another way, if you 
are a sitting member of Congress looking to increase the cost of energy, 
what is a more appealing option:  having your constituents angry at you for 
levying a transparent new energy tax, or having people angry at their utility 
companies and state regulatory commissions because they cannot figure out 
why their electricity bills keep rising each month? 
IV. THE CASE AGAINST CAP AND TRADE 
A. CAP AND TRADE DOES NOT ACTUALLY DO MUCH TO HELP 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
Some of the most pointed criticisms of cap and trade have come not 
from skeptics of human-induced climate change, but from the environ-
mental left and those who are the theory’s leading proponents.12  For exam-
ple, Professor Hansen has described cap and trade as “[a] [c]ircuitous, 
[i]neffectual, [i]nefficient [p]ath to a [c]arbon [p]rice.”13  Professor Hansen 
goes on to dismantle the underlying promise of cap and trade—that it will 
provide certainty GHG emissions will be reduced.14 
Professor Hansen, who has called cap and trade the “Temple of 
Doom,”15 said such certain emissions reductions are a myth.16  Specifically, 
he stated that “[c]ap and trade is not robust.  It has a great number of flaws, 
 
12. See, e.g., Hansen Letter, supra note 7, at 4-7. 
13. Id. at 4. 
14. Id. at 5-6. 
15. James E. Hansen, Worshipping the Temple of Doom, May 5, 2009, http://www.columbia. 
edu/~jeh1/mailings/2009/20090505TempleOfDoom.pdf. 
16. Id. 
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which I am sure you will agree should not be ignored in our analyses.”17  
According to Professor Hansen, the following is a list of some of the 
problems of cap and trade: 
1. Realistic caps are incomplete and do not control what 
matters—total emissions. 
2. Offsets are usually allowed and often poorly substantiated and 
verified, creating more uncertainty. 
3. As with any law, caps can and will be changed, many times, 
before 2050. 
4. National caps have been and are widely rejected, so the global 
cap will be far too high. 
5. When caps are accepted, they are often set too high—as 
happened, e.g., with Russia. 
6. If a complete set of tight caps were achieved, global permit 
trading would likely result in a Gresham’s-Law effect—“bad 
money drives out good.”  Some countries will issue too many 
permits or fail to enforce requirements.  These permits, being 
cheapest, will find their way into the world market and under-
mine the world cap. 
7. Caps are extremely hard to enforce, as demonstrated by the 
Kyoto Protocol.  In some cases, even with highly respected 
countries such as Canada, the extent of failure to meet commit-
ments was enormous. 
The view that we will have a “robust” cap is an illusion based on 
looking at rules for an ideal cap instead of the politics of real 
caps.18 
Professor Hansen’s concerns are echoed by others in the environmental 
movement.19  The following example describes just one of the ways that the 
cap and trade plan may fall far short of meaningful emissions reductions. 
Under the House climate bill, companies could pay for outside 
projects that would reduce GHG emissions—a tree-planting pro-
ject in Brazil, for example—in lieu of making their own cuts.  
Polluters like having this option because it can often be cheaper to, 
say, stop deforestation than build a new wind farm.  The downside, 
 
17. Hansen Letter, supra note 7, at 5. 
18. Id. 
19. Bradford Plumer, Planet Worth:  Goldman Sachs Bets on Global Warming, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 2009, at 7, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/environment-energy/ 
planet-worth. 
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though, is that these projects require heavy scrutiny—you have to 
make sure those newly planted trees aren’t chopped down two 
years later.  So the EPA has to tightly limit what offset projects get 
approved.  But, if Wall Street becomes heavily involved in arrang-
ing and financing offset deals, it might decide to use its lobbying 
clout to increase the number of available offsets—which could 
weaken oversight and let through dubious projects that don’t 
actually bring emissions down.20 
This example illustrates how Wall Street’s interest in maximizing 
profit makes the cap and trade system less rigorous.  Also, more offsets may 
equal more fees charged by Wall Street.21  Some have speculated that this 
scenario will create a “subprime carbon” market similar to the subprime 
mortgage market.22 
In explaining how these types of concerns will manifest themselves in 
public opinion, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, an outspoken 
proponent of reducing carbon emissions, states: 
[Americans] are much less likely to support a firm in London trad-
ing offsets from an electric bill in Boston with a derivatives firm in 
New York in order to help fund an aluminum smelter in Beijing, 
which is what cap-and-trade is all about.  People won’t support 
what they can’t explain.23 
These are the concerns being raised by those who are the most suppor-
tive of government stepping in to reduce GHG emissions.  But legitimate 
criticism of cap and trade does not stop there. 
B. CAP AND TRADE PROVIDES LITTLE PRICE CERTAINTY 
Some supporters of cap and trade, especially those residing within cer-
tain segments of the utility and regulatory community, argue that it has the 
benefit of putting a price on carbon.24  Given the ambiguity associated with 
 
20. Id. at 7-8. 
21. Id. at 8. 
22. See id. “In 2008, Credit Suisse bundled together 25 different offset projects that were at 
various stages of United Nations approval, divvied them up into securities, and sold the pieces off 
to investors—precisely the sort of deal that was rampant during the housing boom and set the 
stage for a meltdown once homeowners started defaulting.” Id. 
23. Thomas Friedman, Show Us the Ball, N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 8, 2009, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/04/08 /opinion/08friedman html. 
24. See National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners [NARUC], Resolution on 
Federal Climate Legislation and Cap-and-Trade Design Principles, at 1, (Nov. 14, 2007) 
available at http://www naruc.org/Resolutions/EL1%20Resolution%20on%20Federal%20Climate 
%20Legislation%20and%20Cap-and-Trade%20Design%20Principles.pdf. 
Despite a diversity of opinion within NARUC’s membership regarding the need for 
national limitations on the emission of GHGs for the purpose of addressing concerns 
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how the federal government plans to act in regards to GHG emissions, they 
argue this price certainty will provide utilities and their regulatory com-
missions the price guidance to help them make decisions about the pru-
dence of various resource procurement options. 
While the desire for better certainty regarding future utility costs is 
understandable, cap and trade may be the vehicle least suited to bringing 
price stability.  As previously discussed, a carbon tax would add a price-
certain to carbon.  A cap without trade would also put a price on carbon by 
making emissions themselves a scarce commodity.  As will be summarized 
in more detail later, all these approaches have an inherent flaw, but cap and 
trade may be the worst of the lot.  It combines the problem of expecting 
governments around the world to voluntarily raise the cost of producing 
energy with a speculative trading scheme that is ill suited to a worldwide 
source such as carbon. 
It pays to be wary of claims that carbon allowance trading will bring 
certainty to the price of carbon.  Any review of recent market history, 
especially emerging markets such as this, will show significant price varia-
bility.  Consider what has happened in recent years in natural gas markets, 
where prices have swung between $2.92 and $10.82 per thousand cubic 
feet.25  Within other commodity markets there have been similar price 
spikes and crashes. 
Potentially more concerning is that long-functioning markets have an 
actual tangible product, a track record, and at least some semblance of 
transparency.  A world-wide carbon credit trading market offers few of 
these assurances.  A number of experts have expressed this view, citing the 
potential for malfeasance, market speculation, and arbitrage that eventually 
is charged to electricity ratepayers: 
Critics of carbon-trading usually focus on this derivatives market, 
which could swell to as much as $2 trillion in the program’s early 
years.  “There’s considerable worry that this market would have 
the problems that have been found in other physical commodity 
markets for the past few years,” says Michael Greenberger, a 
University of Maryland law professor who oversaw the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s trading division in the 
 
over warming of the Earth’s climate, NARUC’s members are in general agreement 
that the enactment of federal legislation limiting such emissions in would be 
appropriate in order to remove existing uncertainties that are hampering the making 
of transmission and generation investment decisions. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
25. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. NATURAL GAS WELLHEAD PRICE (2010), available at 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm. 
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late 1990s.  Speculators, for instance, could artificially inflate the 
price of carbon—which is what some economists think happened 
in the oil markets last year, when the price of crude shot up from 
$60 per barrel in February 2007 to $147 per barrel in 2008.  That, 
in turn, could cause energy prices to skyrocket and lead to a mass 
revolt against the whole idea of a carbon cap . . . .  And many cap-
and-trade skeptics fear that the House and Senate will end up let-
ting Wall Street off easy . . . .  What’s more, says Joseph Mason, 
an economist at Louisiana State University and a critic of carbon 
trading, it’s not always possible to legislate fraud and manipulation 
out of existence.  “A million traders can think of many different 
ways to take advantage of these contracts that you never thought 
of.”26 
The price uncertainty that is created by cap and trade defeats one of its 
stated goals, for if utilities and regulators observe volatile carbon markets, 
they have no better basis for assessing resource selection options than they 
do within the status quo. 
Concerns about the speculative nature of the trade portion of cap and 
trade has led to a small, but perhaps growing, number of federal policy-
makers calling for an alternative to cap and trade.  Among them are United 
States Senators Maria Cantwell (D-WA) and Susan Collins (R-ME), who 
are proposing a “cap-and-dividend” approach that would refund most of the 
money raised through an emissions allowance to consumers.  According to 
the Associated Press: 
Cantwell and Collins largely abandon the broad cap and trade ap-
proach that has been the focus in the Senate up until now, and 
which has been widely attacked by Republicans and some centrist 
Democrats as too complex, subject to manipulation and tanta-
mount to imposing a huge energy tax and threatening jobs. 
While the Cantwell-Collins bill would still limit greenhouse gas 
emissions, it would also allow limited trading of emissions allow-
ances.  The government would auction “carbon shares”—or allow-
ances—to fossil energy producers and importers.  Three-fourths of 
the revenue collected would be returned directly to consumers in 
the form of monthly checks and the rest would be used to spur 
clean energy and energy efficiency development and help in the 
transition to “green” jobs. 
 
26. Plumer, supra note 19, at 6. 
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Allowances could be traded among the energy producers and 
importers that are subject to the cap, but not other traders or 
speculators.27 
While the Cantwell-Collins approach would appear to mitigate many of the 
speculation risks, a pure allowance auction and limited trading of allow-
ances would still allow for a degree of uncertainty in establishing a price on 
carbon due to the inherent uncertainties associated with auctions and trading 
schemes.  Neither is it likely that it would correct some of the economic 
deficiencies that will be discussed later in this article. 
C. CAP AND TRADE IS NOT WELL SUITED TO TACKLING 
CARBON EMISSIONS 
“Wait a minute,” supporters of cap and trade may say.  “The scheme 
worked well for acid rain, an argument disputed by NASA’s Hansen, so it 
should work with carbon too.”  Yet, even this argument fails scrutiny.  A re-
cent article details the surprising fact that the economists who invented cap 
and trade see it as a flawed tool for reducing carbon emissions.28  Retired 
University of Wyoming Economics Professor Thomas Crocker said, “I’m 
skeptical that cap-and-trade is the most effective way to go about regulating 
carbon.”29  His collaborator and fellow economist John Dales, now de-
ceased, echoed similar comments in a 2001 interview saying, “It isn’t a cure 
all for everything.  There are lots of situations that don’t apply.”30 
Additionally, many regulators and others involved with the utility 
industry have identified the problem of drawing comparisons between the 
experience of the sulfur dioxide (acid rain) cap and trade program of the 
1990s and the carbon proposal of today.31  When the former program went 
into effect, there was existing technology to mitigate sulfur dioxide.  
 
27. H. Josef Hebert, Senators Propose New Approach to Climate Issue, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Dec. 11, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/maine/articles/2009/12/11/ 
senatorsproposenewapproachtoclimateissue/. 
28. Jon Hilsenrath, Cap-and-Trade’s Unlikely Critics:  It’s Creators, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 
2009, at A7. 
29. See id. Chief among Crocker’s concerns: 
[C]arbon emissions are a global problem with myriad sources.  Cap-and-trade, he says, 
is better suited for discrete, local pollution problems.  “It is not clear to me how you 
would enforce a permit system internationally,” he says.  “There are no institutions 
right now that have that power.” 
The other problem, Mr. Crocker says, is that quantifying the economic damage of 
climate change . . . is fraught with uncertainty . . . .  Mr. Crocker says cap-and-trade is 
better suited for problems where the damages are clear—like acid rain in the 1990s-
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Therefore, utility companies had an economic choice to make in planning 
for future resource additions and changes.  A utility could choose to install 
the equipment necessary to “clean-up” the coal, or it could use or purchase 
allowances within the cap.  As allowances were tightened and became more 
expensive over time, the economic choice became tilted toward installing 
the environmental compliance technology. 
This bears no resemblance to the carbon issue.  While trials and 
smaller-scale projects involving carbon capture and sequestration are 
promising, no commercially scalable carbon capture technology exists.  In 
such a world, there is no economic choice for a utility to make.  The utility 
either has allowances, granted or purchased, to emit carbon, or it engages in 
a resource switch.  Essentially, the utility chooses to generate its electricity 
from some other lower carbon-intensive source, regardless of economic 
cost. 
The basic problem with the technical mechanics of cap and trade, as 
detailed in Parts IV.A through IV.C of this article, are neatly summarized in 
a quote from Yale Economics Professor William Nordhaus.  In a March 
2009 speech in Copenhagen, he declared: 
[T]he cap-and-trade approach is a poor choice of mechanism.  It is 
untested in the international context; it has been unable to attain 
anything close to universal participation; it loses precious fiscal 
revenues; it leads to volatile prices; and it is an invitation to rent-
seeking.  It is unlikely that the Kyoto model, even if strengthened, 
can achieve its climate objectives in an efficient and effective 
manner.”32 
D. THE COST TO CONSUMERS AND THE ECONOMY 
The cap and trade concern that has garnered the most attention in the 
media is the issue of its impact on consumers and the economy.  The United 
States is in the midst of challenging economic times, especially within 
certain energy intensive sectors like heavy manufacturing.  Jobs are the 
number one issue on many Americans’ minds, and anything that raises con-
sumer costs and is a drag on job creation is sure to be a hot button issue.33 
 
32. William D. Nordhaus, Sterling Professor of Economics, Yale University, Economic 
Issues in a [sic] Designing a Global Agreement on Global Warming, Keynote Speech at Climate 
Change:  Global Risks, Challenges and Decisions, Copenhagen, Den. (Mar. 10, 2009), at 7, 
available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/documents/Copenhagen052909.pdf. 
33. See, e.g., NBC NEWS/WALL STREET JOURNAL SURVEY, Study # 9500 (Jan. 10-14, 
2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJNBCpoll011910.pdf 
(indicating the number one issue facing Americans is jobs and the economy). 
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Supporters of cap and trade have traditionally papered over questions 
about job loss by shifting the discussion to “green jobs” that will be created 
by the policy.  While there would, no doubt, be some of these jobs created, 
to suggest that cap and trade will create a net increase in jobs defies com-
mon sense.  Energy costs are a major input cost for business.  They are 
directly related to America’s competitiveness in the global marketplace.  To 
the degree that these costs increase, all the businesses that pay them must 
divert resources from productive endeavors to less productive ones, such as 
funding a governmentally mandated energy “tax.” 
For supporters of cap and trade to liken this to a job creation program is 
to believe in the broken window theory of economic development.  
Government could, if it wanted, pay people to smash windows.  This would 
“create” window jobs.  Businesses would need to spend money to replace 
them, and window manufacturers would need to ramp-up production and 
hire new workers.  But no rational person would suggest this as a jobs 
program because it is only shifting dollars around; it is not a net increase in 
productivity.  Similarly, government could pay people to dig holes in the 
middle of nowhere, but again, such programs come at a cost of taking 
money away from productive uses and diverting it to less productive ones. 
Furthermore, proponents of cap and trade have argued that analysis 
conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO) indicate that it would only cost an average 
American family about a postage stamp a day.34  But independent review of 
those studies suggests significant flaws in that reasoning.  A George C. 
Marshall Institute report summarized the lowball EPA-CBO cost estimates 
as such: 
Saying the cost of ACESA [American Clean Energy Security Act] 
is just a single postage stamp a day is an appealing rhetorical flour-
ish.  But, even using the most favorable cost estimate, this rhetoric 
oversimplifies the uncertainties and impacts surrounding the bill.  
Advocates of Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade would be kind to 
 
34. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Cap-and-Trade Would Slow Economy, CBO Chief Says, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 15, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/ 
10/14/AR2009101404054 html. 
Representative Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), co-author of the House bill with Repre-
sentative Henry A. Waxman (D-Calif.), said that several independent analyses, 
including one by the CBO, had found their bill “would only cost about a postage 
stamp a day, and that’s before you include thousands of dollars in savings from 
energy-efficiency gains.  The harsh reality is that America’s global warming and 
energy challenges are just too important for us to keep mailing it in by not enacting a 
comprehensive energy and global warming bill.” 
Id. 
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themselves and their credibility if they mailed the postage stamp 
back to the post office.35 
Common sense also dictates that cap and trade will be a proposition 
that costs more than a day’s pocket change.  It pays to remember that the 
stated purpose of the program is to raise energy costs.  To the degree it does 
not, it cannot accomplish its goal.  If prices do not rise enough to force 
utilities to change the resources they select and consumers to change con-
sumption patterns, the program will fail.  The notion that those things can 
happen for the cost of a postage stamp a day does not pass the smell test. 
Rather, a number of rigorous studies support what should be self-evi-
dent.  Raising energy costs in a global market, especially unilaterally, will 
result in economic pain and dislocation for American workers and con-
sumers.  One such study was commissioned by the American Council for 
Capital Formation and the National Association of Manufacturers (ACCF-
NAM).  Its conclusions are a stark reminder of the impact of energy costs.36  
The report demonstrates how the United States economy “slows under the 
Waxman-Markey bill (H.R. 2454), especially in the post-2020 period as the 
free emission allowances are phased out for both energy producers and 
energy consumers.”37  The report predicted: 
In 2030, the inflation adjusted, annual GDP level is reduced by 
1.8% (or $419 billion) under the low cost scenario and by 2.4% (or 
$571 billion) under the high cost scenario, compared to the base-
line forecast (see Table 1).  To put these GDP losses in perspec-
tive, in 2008 the Federal government spent $612 billion on social 
security payments to retirees.  Looked at another way, if GDP 
levels are reduced by $571 billion in 2030, Federal and State tax 
receipts will be approximately $170 billion lower that year since 
Federal and State governments take approximately 30 cents out of 
every dollar of GDP.  Thus, government budgets will be harder to 
meet. 
Over the entire 18 year period (2012-2030) covered by ACCF-
NAM analysis, cumulative GDP losses are substantial, ranging 
from $2.2 trillion dollars under the low cost case to $3.1 trillion 
under the high cost case.  Again, the hit to Federal and State 
 
35. Rachel Schwartz, Waxman-Markey Costs More Than a Postage Stamp, GEORGE C. 
MARSHALL INSTITUTE POLICY OUTLOOK, Aug. 2009, at 3, available at http://www marshall.org/ 
pdf/materials/757.pdf. 
36. See AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION & NAT’L ASSOC. OF MANUFACTURERS, 
ANALYSIS OF THE WAXMAN-MARKEY BILL (2009), http://www.accf.org/media/dynamic/3/ 
media_387.pdf [hereinafter ANALYSIS]. 
37. Id. at 4. 
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budgets is large, cumulative tax receipts will be reduced by 
between $670 billion and $930 billion compared to the baseline 
forecast.38 
Industrial production is found to take a particularly hard hit under the cap 
and trade regime.  It “begins to decline immediately in 2012, relative to the 
baseline forecast, under the Waxman-Markey bill. In 2030, U.S. industrial 
output levels are reduced by between 5.3% and 6.5% under the low and 
high cost scenarios.”39 
There is also a significant projected dampening of the employment 
outlook.  Regarding employment, the ACCF-NAM report found that: 
Employment is negatively impacted by Waxman-Markey, even 
when additional “green” jobs are factored in.  Over the 2012-2030 
period, total U.S. employment averages between 420,000 and 
610,000 fewer jobs each year under the low and high cost sce-
narios than under the baseline forecast.  In 2030, there are between 
1,790,000 and 2,440,000 fewer jobs in the overall economy.  
Manufacturing employment is hard hit:  by 2030 there are between 
580,000 and 740,000 fewer jobs, or between a 6 and 7% reduction 
in total manufacturing employment in the U.S compared to the 
baseline forecast.  On average, over the 2012-2030 period, the 
manufacturing sector absorbs 59 to 66% of the overall job losses 
caused by the Waxman-Markey bill.40 
Finally, the report concludes there is a significant negative risk for 
average American consumers.41  It finds “that residential electricity prices 
are 5 to 8% higher by 2020, by 2030 electricity prices are between 31 to 
50% higher.  Gasoline prices are also higher.  By 2030 prices are up to 20 
to 26% higher than under the baseline forecast.”42 
The net result for household income is a decrease: 
[U]nder the Waxman-Markey bill, even after accounting for re-
bates to consumers mandated in the bill.  In 2030, the decline in 
annual household income ranges from about $730 in the low cost 
case to about $1,248 in the high cost case.  However the impacts 
on individual states, especially in the Midwest, are about twice as 
high as the national average.43 
 
38. Id. at 4-5. 
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E. THE COST TO NORTH DAKOTA 
Disparate regional impacts should be particularly concerning for North 
Dakota policy makers.  While the Midwest generally may be particularly 
hard hit by cap and trade, North Dakota may be the hardest hit of all.  In 
April 2009, the North Dakota Public Service Commission (PSC) convened 
the Carbon Cap-and-Trade Summit to discuss the consumer impact of vari-
ous cap and trade proposals working their way through Congress at the 
time.44  As the agency charged with setting utility rates and protecting con-
sumers of essential services provided by state-sanctioned monopolies, the 
PSC analysis focused specifically on ratepayer impacts in North Dakota—
as opposed to general economic impacts or impacts on North Dakota’s 
sizable electricity production industry, which includes both fossil fuels and 
renewable resources.45 
In its summary report of the summit, the PSC issued a number of key 
findings: 
1. North Dakota is one of the most coal dependent states and its 
consumers will be impacted more than those in nearly any 
other state. 
2. North Dakotans currently pay some of the lowest electricity 
rates in the nation. 
3. Energy bills are regressive in nature and higher energy costs 
will harm low-income customers the most. 
4. Increased energy prices will result in an overall increase in 
costs of goods and services. 
5. Abrupt changes in energy policy could be inefficient and cause 
undue harm, both from an economic and electric reliability 
standpoint. 
6. Commercial scale carbon capture technology is still in its 
infancy.46 
Given North Dakota’s status as one of the top coal dependent states in the 
nation along with its low electricity costs, the upward price risk for con-
sumers is substantial. 
That fact is borne out by the information provided to the PSC by the 
state’s utility companies.  While each potential impact varied, a common 
 
44. N.D. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, CARBON CAP & TRADE SUMMIT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
(Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.psc.state nd.us/hottopics/Exec-Summary-Carbon-Cap-
and-Trade-Summit-FinalVersion%20copy.pdf. 
45. Id. at 1. 
46. Id. at 2. 
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trend and theme emerged from the reports.  Montana-Dakota Utilities, an 
investor-owned utility that provides electricity service to portions of central 
and western North Dakota, reported that an additional $20 per ton cost of 
carbon—$20 is often viewed as a realistic initial per ton assessment, with 
costs increasing over time—would result in a 40% increase for residential 
customers, and a 52% rate increase for industrial customers.47  Minnkota 
Power Cooperative, a member-owned generation and transmission (G&T) 
cooperative that provides service to distribution utilities throughout eastern 
North Dakota and northwestern Minnesota, reported their rates would rise 
25% for every $10 per ton cost assessed to carbon.48  Basin Electric Power 
Cooperative, a similar G&T utility that provides service to cooperative dis-
tribution utilities throughout several states in the central and western United 
States, estimates cap-and-trade could cost its consumers $498 million in 
2012, with its North Dakota consumers paying $99 million of that.49  Otter 
Tail Power Company, an investor-owned utility serving portions of central 
and eastern North Dakota and northwest Minnesota said each $10 per ton 
carbon cost would increase residential rates by 12.5% and industrial rates 
by 16%.50 
Perhaps the most telling fact regarding cap and trade’s specific impact 
on North Dakota was a report of the National Rural Electric Cooperative 
Association, which indicated that North Dakota consumers of its member 
cooperatives would see the largest rate impacts of any ratepayers in the 
nation, approximately $25 for every $20 per ton cost assessed.51  The PSC 
itself calculated that the average annual increase for a 1000 kilowatt hour 
per month user of electricity would total $350 at a low-end $20 per ton car-
bon “tax.”  If carbon costs go up to as high as $60 per ton, not an unrealistic 
assumption over time, the increase would total $1051 per year.52 
In assessing the information provided at the summit, the PSC con-
cluded with the following recommendations: 
Based on the concerns and data presented at the summit, the Com-
mission opposes cap and trade.  However, the Commission would 
offer the following recommendations if Congress does proceed 




49. Id. at 3. 
50. Id. 
51. Id.  
52. Id. at 4. 
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• Revenue generated from any carbon regulation should be 
targeted for carbon technology research and development, 
not as an excuse for further government spending.  In no 
instance should cap and trade become a new general gov-
ernment revenue source.  Doing so would ensure that 
North Dakotans would pay a disproportionate share of the 
cost of federal government spending. 
• Any effective solution must be global.  All carbon emitting 
countries like China need to be involved. 
• All sources of energy must be included in Cap and Trade.  
Carbon regulation cannot be targeted only at electricity 
ratepayers. 
• Targets should be achievable and timed with technology 
advancements, not based on unrealistic or arbitrary Con-
gressional mandates. 
• Reduction proposals should have safeguards so the 
economy and consumers don’t suffer. 
• There needs to be protections against market manipulations 
and large price swings.  Emission reduction proposals, 
such as cap and trade, must include an economic safety 
valve to avoid excessive financial hardships, market 
manipulation or large price swings. 
• Local distribution utilities should receive free allowances 
for emissions.  State regulation ensures that this will not 
become a “windfall” for utility shareholders.  Free allow-
ances help mitigate the potential for skyrocketing elec-
tricity rates that are inherent in the President’s 100 percent 
auction model. 
The Commission does hasten to note, that even if the recom-
mendations listed above are included in the legislation, it finds the 
cap and trade concept so inherently flawed and harmful to North 
Dakota consumers, that it is still a proposal that should be rejected 
by Congress.53 
What should be particularly disconcerting to North Dakotans is the fact 
that the pain associated with cap and trade is not evenly shared by all 
Americans.  In fact, relative to North Dakota, some states might cynically 
support it as a means for having its interests subsidized by the heartland of 
 
53. Id. at 7-8. 
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America.  While an average North Dakotan might see his or her electricity 
rates increase hundreds of dollars per year, someone living in a state served 
primarily by nuclear or hydro power, for example, would see very little 
increase.  Yet most of the cap and trade plans have revenue generated from 
it either spent on general fund projects or on broad-based dividend returns 
to Americans generally. 
Worse yet, most of the plans currently working their way through Con-
gress call for the allocation of allowances to utilities to be based on both the 
amount of carbon emitted and the actual energy sales of the utility.54  In 
other words, a portion of the free allocation of allowances to utilities is 
based not on how much carbon a utility has emitted, but on a utility’s retail 
load. 
The problem with this approach is that it means utilities that simply 
happen to have low carbon resources, such as a large nuclear fleet or those 
that reside in a large hydro power area, get a huge windfall of allowances 
which they do not need and can then sell into the cap and trade market at a 
substantial profit.  It is an unearned windfall, and not coincidentally, 
explains the support given cap and trade by certain large, nuclear-based 
utility companies. 
All of these things equate to a large tax imposed primarily on citizens 
living in the heartland of the country, which is the part of the nation most 
dependent on fossil based energy for its electricity.  Adding to the inequal-
ity of the matter is the fact that federal law actually encouraged these 
utilities to build plants in the first place.  Under the Powerplant and Indus-
trial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (Fuel Use Act), which was repealed in 1987, the 
federal government strongly discouraged natural gas plants and encouraged 
those parts of our nation that were coal-rich to build coal plants.55 
In the 1970s, the utilities that were building nuclear plants and hydro 
plants, or coal plants for that matter, were not doing so because of fear of 
global warming, as the 1970s were the time of the Ice Age scare.  Rather, 
they were just following federal energy law and building the power plants 
that made the most economic sense for their customers at that time.  For 
those in middle America to now have to shoulder not only the bulk of the 
cost of switching to a lower carbon intensive electricity resource portfolio, 
but also transfer their wealth to utility companies and consumers in other 
parts of the nation, seems more than just a little unfair. 
If North Dakotans are looking for an acknowledgement of the signifi-
cant regional disparities in the burden of cap and trade, there has not yet 
 
54. See, e.g., ACESA §§ 782(a), 783(b). 
55. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8301(b)(2) (2005). 
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been much sympathy given by those whose states are winners less nega-
tively impacted by the plan.  For example, United States Senator Frank 
Lautenberg (D-NJ), recently described his feelings on the regional disparity 
issue as follows: 
[To] use a cliché around here, that says what goes around comes 
around . . . . 
. . . [T]here are very few states that haven’t at some time or another 
been there with their hand out, with their plea for the federal 
government to please come help us, move our citizens away from 
flooded areas, et cetera, et cetera . . . . 
. . . So we are all in this together.56 
The politics of all this is, perhaps, understandable.  But that alone does 
not make for good public policy.  It is little wonder cap and trade has been 
nearly universally panned by North Dakota’s elected officials of both 
parties.57 
V. CONCLUSION 
Readers might ask, “Well, if cap and trade is unacceptable, what are 
the options?”  It is a fair question.  While this author claims no special 
expertise in the science of global warming, it is fair to make a few obser-
vations.  Much continues to be written about the nature of anthropogenic 
global warming theories and the degree of actual human impact.  It seems 
 
56. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act:  Hearing on S. 1733 Before the S. Comm. 
on Env’t and Pub. Works, 111th Cong. 93 (2009) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg, Member, 
S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works). 
57. See John Hoeven, Governor, Statement of Governor John Hoeven State of North Dakota 
Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate, (July 21, 2009), 
available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id= 
984adb4f-6b71-4e1a-a362-b7e2ae4d49cf.  As of the writing of this article, no member of North 
Dakota’s all-Democrat congressional delegation has announced his support for cap and trade.  
Rep. Earl Pomeroy (D-ND) voted against it in the U.S. House of Representatives on June 26, 
2009. Id.  Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND) has provided generally unfavorable reviews of the “trade” 
portion of cap and trade. Id.  And as noted in this article, the all-Republican North Dakota Public 
Service Commission has also gone on-record as opposed to cap and trade. Id. 
North Dakota’s congressional delegation is ready to oppose “cap and trade” energy 
policies.  That’s what the three men told participants at the annual meeting of Central 
Power Electric Cooperative today.  Senators Kent Conrad and Byron Dorgan and 
Congressman Earl Pomeroy appeared via satellite at the meeting this afternoon.  They 
pledged their support for heading off plans now in congress to impose a system of 
carbon limits and taxes known as cap and trade. 
KXNet.com, Delegation Talks Energy, http://www kxnet.com/custom404.asp?404;http:// 
www.kxnet.com/t/kent-conrad/544557.asp (last visited July 1, 2010).  See also Walter 
Alarkon, Fast-track resolution instructions likely to be used to push tax legislation, THE HILL, 
Apr. 21, 2010, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/93693-fast-track-resolution-instructions-
likely-to-be-used-to-push-tax-bill (“Conrad told reporters he would oppose using the recon-
ciliation instruction to pass a carbon emissions cap-and-trade scheme, as he did last year.”). 
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as though we are still very much in the infancy of understanding global 
climate models, man’s interaction with the climate, and what it all means 
for the long term prosperity of mankind; to think otherwise borders on an 
act of hubris. 
Furthermore, climate change supporters find themselves on the defen-
sive due to the release of e-mails that show some of the top climate 
researchers in the world engaged in a long-term pattern of attempting to 
undermine the scientific process.58  Peer reviewing is at the heart of this 
process, and it is clear that a number of the researchers were systematically 
“de-peering” scientists and academic journals that took contrary views.  
This scientific debate, the proving and reproving, is the heart of good 
science.  Rather, there appears to be the deliberate creation of an echo 
chamber, in which only those scientists predisposed to one line of thought 
are considered “peers.”59  Does this alone disprove anthropogenic global 
warming?  No, but it, paired with red flags being raised by well-qualified 
scientists, should give all serious students of the matter at least some pause 
for reflection.60 
Yet, setting aside these arguments over science, it would still seem 
irresponsible for us to do nothing.  While carbon-based resources are much, 
much cleaner than ever before, they do have an environmental impact, even 
beyond GHGs, that any conservation-minded person would want kept at an 
acceptable minimum.  In addition, it is foolhardy to suggest that the way we 
produce energy today is the ultimate manner in which energy will be har-
nessed for all time.  Rather, all of recorded history shows a march towards 
 
58. Kim Zetter, Hacked E-mails Fuel Climate Change Debate, CNN (Nov. 26, 2009), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/11/23/hacker.climate/index html. 
59. Patrick Michaels, How to Manufacture a Climate Consensus, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 
2009, available at http//online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870439830457459823042603 
7244 html.  Michaels makes the compelling argument that the undermining of refereed scientific 
literature is the great scandal of what has come to be known as “Climategate.” 
60. See id.  Space constraints alone would prevent a listing of the names of scientists, pro and 
con, with regard to the climate change debate.  In any event, this article is a critique of one of the 
policy proposals to reduce GHGs, rather than a debate over the science of global warming.  
Suffice it to say there are qualified scientists on both sides of the matter and the Climategate 
scandal itself proves there is still debate occurring within the scientific community.  The position 
of many scientists on the pro-side would be expressed through the work of the International Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC).  See IPCC Home Page, http://www.ipcc.ch/.  Those with a different 
viewpoint do not necessarily have an umbrella organization as such, but some examples of 
scientists questioning the scope and nature of anthropogenic climate change theories are, to name 
a few:  Roy Spencer, PhD, Principle Research Scientist at the University of Alabama-Huntsville; 
Richard S. Lindzen, Alfred P. Sloan Professor of Atmospheric Science, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology; William Gray, Professor Emeritus, Department of Atmospheric Science, Colorado 
State University; and Ian Plimer, Professor, School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, 
University of Adelaide, Australia. 
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more useful, higher-ordered forms of power.61  Thus, it only makes sense 
for us to keep looking for newer, better, cleaner, and more cost effective 
ways to produce power. 
If the question truly is how to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels, 
then research and development is the only answer that will effectively lower 
carbon usage worldwide.  No nation will ever work for long against the 
economic and quality of life interests of its own citizens—not even in 
Europe.  Carbon will be used until it is not the economic fuel of choice. 
Proponents of cap and trade, or any of the various “put a price on 
carbon” plans, believe this can be “corrected” by artificially raising the 
price of carbon.  This is politically and economically infeasible on a world-
wide basis.  It is pure folly to suggest that the world will reduce carbon-
based energy by hoping that each government will intentionally raise its 
own cost to produce energy.  Access to energy and the cost of energy are 
the building blocks of every society and every economy.  Individuals and 
governments will not work against their own economic self interests, and to 
believe otherwise is to believe a fairy tale.  No legitimate government in the 
history of the world has ever worked to keep its citizens poor, mal-
nourished, and without the basic necessities of life that are afforded by the 
use of energy resources. 
Understanding that people work in their own self interest to provide for 
their own basic needs, like food and shelter, is the key to unlocking the 
GHG conundrum.  Any proposal whose primary thrust is to raise energy 
costs will inevitably fail.  The incentives for countries to cheat or merely 
avoid the system are too great to overcome, especially in the developing 
world where issues of poverty are the most pervasive.  The bureaucracies 
needed to administer and monitor cap and trade systems for a worldwide 
substance like carbon are too leviathan to bear, the risk of fraud and 
manipulation too great. 
Rather, the key is to make alternatives to fossil fuels so attractive that 
no one would do anything but the alternative.  And the important thing to 
remember is cap and trade is not needed to make this happen.  Only through 
the funding of massive research and development will we find new ways to 
harness the power needed to advance the human condition.  New ways to 
produce energy need to be developed.  These new forms of power must be 
able to successfully compete against the cost of carbon on a basis wherein 
carbon’s price is not artificially inflated by governments.  Only then will we 
 
61. PETER W. HUBER & MARK P. MILLS, THE BOTTOMLESS WELL:  THE TWILIGHT OF 
FUEL, THE VIRTUE OF WASTE, AND WHY WE WILL NEVER RUN OUT OF ENERGY (2005) 
(describing this transformation).  Bill Gates said it “is the only book I’ve ever seen that really 
explains energy, its history and what it will be like going forward.” Id. 
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have reached a point where no nation, no regulatory commission, no utility, 
and no developer would want to do anything but utilize the alternative 
because it would be economic suicide to do otherwise.62 
The sooner we recognize that this is the solution, the sooner we can 
begin a “Manhattan-Style Project” to get there.  In the meantime, we should 
not waste another dime of our money or minute of our time on proposals 
like cap and trade, which do little to help the environment and are a great 
cost to consumers, businesses, and America’s global competitiveness.  A 
program that combines environmental futility with a large imposition of 
costs is not forward-looking and it is not progressive.  It is merely self-
destructive and should be rejected. 
 
 
62. See, e.g., Bjørn Lomborg, Technology Can Fight Global Warming, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
28, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020370660457437644255 
9564788 html.  The notion that research and development is key, paired with economic realism 
about the costs and benefits of various approaches to climate change, is an argument forwarded by 
a number of analysts. Id. 
